Qasem Soleimani

Qasem Soleimani was an Iranian military officer and commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force from 1998 until his death in 2020. He directed Iran’s external military and intelligence operations and became one of the country’s most influential officials. His work involved support for allied armed organizations, coordination with governments and participation in conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

Soleimani was killed by a United States drone strike near Baghdad International Airport on 3 January 2020. The US government said he was responsible for attacks on American personnel and posed an imminent threat. Iran condemned the strike as an unlawful assassination and promised retaliation. His death produced large public demonstrations in Iran and increased tensions between Tehran and Washington.

Soleimani’s public reputation differed sharply across audiences. Iranian state media portrayed him as a national hero and defender of the country. US and Israeli officials described him as a key architect of regional militancy and attacks against their forces. His career illustrates Iran’s use of military partners to project power and the risks of direct confrontation between states.

Early life and military career

Soleimani was born in 1957 in Qanat-e Malek, a village in Kerman province. His family worked in agriculture, and he moved to the city of Kerman as a young adult. He worked for the provincial water organization and became involved in the political unrest that preceded the 1979 revolution. His early life was outside the clerical and political elite that later governed Iran.

After the revolution, Soleimani joined the newly established IRGC. When Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, he served on the front lines and rose through the ranks. He commanded the 41st Tharallah Division, which recruited fighters from Kerman province and participated in major operations. The war shaped his military outlook and built personal ties with commanders who later held senior positions.

The Iran–Iraq War ended in 1988, but the IRGC continued to expand its military and political role. Soleimani served in southeastern Iran, where security forces confronted smuggling and armed groups near the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan. His performance and relationships within the Guard positioned him for promotion to the Quds Force command.

Commander of the Quds Force

Soleimani became commander of the Quds Force in 1998. The unit conducts external operations, intelligence, training and support for organizations aligned with Iran. It reports through the IRGC command structure to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Soleimani developed direct relationships with political and military leaders across the region and was frequently involved in sensitive negotiations.

The Quds Force supported Hezbollah in Lebanon with funding, training and weapons, according to US and Israeli officials. Soleimani helped coordinate Iran’s assistance and strengthened the organization’s military capacity. Hezbollah also developed its own political base and leadership, making it a partner with local interests rather than simply a unit under Iranian command.

Soleimani’s contacts extended to Iraqi Shia political and armed groups. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Iran cultivated relationships with parties and militias that opposed the American presence. Several organizations later joined the Popular Mobilization Forces, a state-recognized umbrella created to fight the Islamic State. The overlap between state security institutions and groups with external ties became a source of political tension in Baghdad.

He also maintained relationships with Afghan factions and politicians. During the US-led war in Afghanistan, Iran opposed the Taliban and supported some of its adversaries, while later developing tactical contacts with the Taliban around border security and regional issues. These relationships reflected Iran’s preference for multiple channels of influence rather than fixed alliances.

Soleimani’s approach relied on personal relationships and long-term investment in local organizations. He met commanders and political leaders directly, arranged training and equipment, and helped coordinate among groups with different domestic constituencies. The Quds Force’s work ranged from intelligence to logistics and operational planning. This method let Iran influence events without deploying conventional armies on the scale of its rivals, while making responsibility for specific attacks harder to establish.

Role in Iraq and Syria

Following the US invasion of Iraq, Soleimani’s network supported armed groups that attacked coalition forces. American officials accused Iran of providing explosively formed penetrators and other weapons that killed US soldiers. Iran denied directing attacks and argued that American occupation had destabilized Iraq. Soleimani’s role in coordinating Iraqi groups made him a central figure in the security relationship between Tehran and Baghdad.

In 2014, the Islamic State seized large areas of Iraq and Syria. Soleimani helped organize Iranian support for Iraqi forces and allied militias, and he appeared near battle zones during operations. The crisis created overlapping interests between Iran, the Iraqi government and the US-led coalition, even though the parties lacked a formal alliance. Iranian-backed groups were among the forces that helped regain territory from the Islamic State.

When the Syrian civil war began, Iran supported the government of Bashar al-Assad with military advisers, funding and allied fighters. Soleimani coordinated deployments by Hezbollah and other formations. In 2015, he traveled to Moscow and discussed military cooperation with Russian leaders, preceding Russia’s direct intervention in Syria. The combined support helped Assad regain territory, including Aleppo, though the war caused immense civilian suffering and displacement.

Soleimani became a public symbol of Iran’s regional strategy. Photographs showed him in Iraq and Syria with militia commanders and political figures. His personal access to Khamenei and his ability to coordinate among different organizations gave him unusual influence. The strategy expanded Iran’s leverage but provoked military responses and contributed to sectarian conflict.

After the September 2001 attacks in the United States, Iran and Washington shared an interest in defeating the Taliban government in Afghanistan. Iranian representatives participated in diplomatic discussions that helped establish a post-Taliban administration, although the relationship deteriorated after President George W. Bush included Iran in the “axis of evil.” Soleimani’s contacts in Afghanistan reflected a pragmatic effort to limit threats on Iran’s eastern border while opposing American military presence.

In Iraq, Soleimani’s influence grew as governments depended on coalitions that included parties with close ties to Tehran. He helped mediate among leaders and align armed groups during periods of political crisis. Iraqi nationalists and officials criticized such intervention as a challenge to sovereignty. Iranian leaders argued that Iraq’s stability was essential to Iran’s security and that their partners had legitimate political support inside the country.

Political activity and public image

Soleimani was not an elected official, but he participated in political negotiations and advised senior leaders. He worked with Iraqi governments formed after 2003 and was involved in discussions over coalition formation and security policy. His influence raised questions about the sovereignty of Iraq and the extent to which Iranian officials could shape decisions in neighboring states.

In Iran, state media celebrated Soleimani as a patriotic defender and a humble soldier. His image was used in posters, documentaries and public ceremonies. He was portrayed as protecting Iran from the Islamic State and foreign threats. Large crowds attended ceremonies honoring him, especially after his death, though the scale of official events did not reflect all views within Iranian society.

Outside Iran, governments and analysts described Soleimani as the principal architect of Iran’s regional network. The United States designated him and the IRGC as terrorist entities and imposed sanctions. Israel regarded him as a central planner of weapons transfers and military positions near its borders. His supporters argued that Iran’s actions were defensive responses to foreign intervention and threats.

Soleimani was careful about public political ambitions. He denied interest in the presidency and presented himself as a military officer rather than a politician. His role nonetheless made him influential in domestic debates and in the security establishment. His death created an opening for speculation about the balance of power within the IRGC and the future of Iran’s regional policy.

Assassination and legal debate

On 3 January 2020, a US drone strike killed Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, near Baghdad airport. The United States said the operation was ordered by President Donald Trump to prevent imminent attacks and deter further aggression. Iraq’s government condemned the strike as a violation of its sovereignty and described it as an assassination.

Iran retaliated days later by launching ballistic missiles at Iraqi bases housing US troops. American personnel suffered traumatic brain injuries, though no fatalities were reported from the missile attack. The episode brought the two countries close to open war. Iran also announced steps away from the nuclear deal’s restrictions, while the United States imposed additional sanctions.

Legal experts debated whether the strike complied with US law and international law. The Trump administration argued that it was an act of self-defense. Critics questioned the evidence of an imminent threat and argued that killing a senior official on Iraqi soil violated Iraqi sovereignty and the prohibition on extrajudicial killing. The United Nations special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions concluded that the strike was unlawful under international law.

The assassination affected Iraqi politics as well as US-Iran relations. Iraq’s parliament voted to call for the withdrawal of foreign troops, though implementation was contested. Armed groups vowed revenge, and attacks on coalition forces continued. Soleimani’s death removed an experienced intermediary but did not dismantle the networks he had helped cultivate.

Iran’s response to Soleimani’s death included a public funeral procession through several cities and a vote in parliament demanding the departure of US forces from Iraq. State officials described the funeral as a national expression of grief and defiance. Some Iranian residents joined the ceremonies, while others viewed them through the lens of state pressure and the economic difficulties facing the country. His burial in Kerman became a site for annual commemorations.

His public profile grew as Iranian authorities promoted the image of a commander who could move between front lines and diplomatic meetings. He was photographed with fighters, tribal leaders and elected officials. These images connected him to the state’s claims that it had helped defend Iraq and Syria from the Islamic State. The same visibility made him a prominent target for adversaries and a symbol of Iran’s regional policy.

Legacy

Soleimani’s legacy is inseparable from the Quds Force and Iran’s regional strategy. He built durable relationships with armed and political partners, coordinated military campaigns and helped expand Iranian influence. His personal leadership gave the network coherence, but its constituent groups retained their own priorities and domestic constituencies.

His supporters view him as a defender of Iran and a commander who helped defeat the Islamic State. Critics regard him as responsible for supporting armed groups that killed civilians, American troops and Israeli targets. The same military ties that increased Iran’s influence also contributed to instability and repeated cycles of retaliation.

After his death, Ismail Qaani succeeded him as Quds Force commander. The organization continued its regional activities, demonstrating that Soleimani had built institutions and relationships beyond his personal authority. Yet no successor fully replicated his public stature or direct access to political leaders across the region.

The strike on Soleimani became a precedent in debates over targeted killing of senior officials. It showed how a conflict conducted through partners could abruptly become a direct confrontation between states. The long-term consequences remain visible in Iraq’s political debate, Iranian security policy and regional relations.

Sanctions restricted Soleimani’s travel and froze assets connected to the Quds Force. The United States and several partner governments designated the force as a terrorist organization and accused it of planning attacks abroad. Iran rejected those designations and argued that the unit operated in support of recognized governments. The sanctions did not prevent Soleimani from traveling through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, where local partners facilitated his movements.