Popular Mobilization Forces

The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) are an Iraqi umbrella organization of armed factions formed in 2014 as the Islamic State seized large areas of the country. The PMF helped defend Baghdad and other cities and participated in campaigns to retake territory. Iraq’s parliament later recognized the organization as part of the state’s security forces, placing it under the authority of the prime minister.

The PMF is not a single uniform force. It includes groups with different origins, ideologies and command structures, including long-established parties and militias as well as units formed during the emergency. Some factions maintain strong ties to Iran and to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Others are associated with Iraq’s religious authorities or local communities. Their integration into the state has been incomplete, and some retain independent political and military authority.

The organization’s role remains contested. Its fighters were important in defeating the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate, but some PMF factions have been accused of abuses against civilians, repression of protesters and attacks on foreign forces. The Iraqi government faces the challenge of incorporating armed groups into a unified national chain of command while preserving security and accountability. The PMF’s future is closely tied to Iraq’s sovereignty, political system and relationship with Iran.

Background and formation

Before 2014, Iraq already had numerous armed groups, including parties and militias formed after the 2003 invasion. Some were linked to political movements, others to religious authorities or regional patrons. The United States-led invasion dismantled state institutions and created a security vacuum. Subsequent sectarian conflict and the withdrawal of American forces left the Iraqi government with a weak military and competing centers of armed power.

In June 2014, the Islamic State captured Mosul and advanced toward Baghdad. Iraqi security forces collapsed in several areas, abandoning equipment and positions. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a call for citizens to defend the country, which was interpreted by the Iraqi government and religious institutions as a call for mobilization. The state created a framework to recruit volunteers and coordinate existing factions. These forces became known collectively as the Popular Mobilization.

The initial PMF included seven major factions established before the crisis, along with new volunteers and local groups. Prominent formations included the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah and Saraya al-Khorasani. Other units were associated with shrines and religious authorities, while Sunni Arab, Turkmen, Christian and other minority volunteers also joined. The composition varied by region and changed as the campaign developed.

The creation of the PMF responded to an immediate security emergency, not to a long-term plan for a unified military force. The Iraqi army required time to rebuild, and the volunteer formations brought combat experience and local networks. The government’s reliance on these groups helped stop the Islamic State’s advance but created institutional challenges that persisted after the emergency.

Legal status and command structure

In 2016, Iraq’s parliament passed legislation recognizing the PMF as a military formation associated with the armed forces. The law placed the organization under the command of the prime minister and required its members to follow military rules. The measure gave the PMF a formal state status and access to public funds. It also sought to establish a legal basis for controlling the groups that had fought against the Islamic State.

The PMF Commission oversees the organization and coordinates its brigades. The prime minister is formally commander-in-chief, and the PMF is legally part of the Iraqi security apparatus. In practice, implementation has been uneven. Some units follow government orders closely, while others have maintained their own leadership, weapons, political organizations and relationships with foreign actors.

The distinction between the PMF as a state institution and its component factions is important. The umbrella organization receives a government budget and has official responsibilities. Individual groups may operate with their own internal chains of command and political agendas. State recognition has not necessarily dissolved their prior structures or transferred effective control to the Iraqi army.

The PMF has organized units across Iraq and established regional operations commands. Some brigades are tied to particular provinces or communities; others operate nationally. Leadership appointments and administrative reforms have sought to standardize the force. Internal disputes, factional competition and influence from political parties have complicated efforts to create common discipline and a unified command.

Public estimates of PMF personnel vary because sources count active fighters, registered members, support staff and affiliated personnel differently. The Iraqi government publishes official budget and personnel figures, but independent verification is limited. Figures should therefore be associated with a specific source and year rather than treated as precise current totals.

Composition and organization

Shiite Arab factions

Shiite Arab formations constitute the largest component of the PMF. They include the Badr Organization, which developed from an armed movement founded during the Iran–Iraq War, and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, which split from the Mahdi Army. Kata'ib Hezbollah is another prominent faction, known for its close relationship with Iran and its role in attacks on American forces. Other groups formed around shrine networks and clerical authorities.

The factions differ in their relationship to Iraq’s religious leadership and to Iran. Some emphasize loyalty to the supreme religious authority in Najaf, while others align more closely with Tehran’s doctrine of clerical political authority. These differences have shaped disputes over command, state integration and foreign policy. The PMF’s umbrella designation does not imply a common ideology or identical operational behavior.

Some factions have created political parties or participated in elections through allied lists. PMF-affiliated political organizations have won seats in parliament and gained influence over ministries and local government. This political-military overlap has raised concerns about conflicts of interest and the use of state resources to strengthen armed groups. Leaders argue that electoral participation gives their constituencies representation after years of insecurity.

Sunni and minority components

Sunni Arab units joined the PMF in areas threatened by the Islamic State. These formations included local tribal fighters who sought to defend their communities and retake towns. Their participation helped broaden the force beyond a purely Shiite structure, though the scale and permanence of Sunni representation varied. Some Sunni volunteers later complained of exclusion, delayed salaries or limited influence in the organization.

Turkmen, Christian, Yazidi and other minority units also formed or joined PMF brigades. Local groups sought protection for their communities after attacks by the Islamic State and the displacement of residents. Their relationship with the umbrella organization was shaped by local security needs, political alliances and the availability of resources. These units could offer a degree of community self-defense, while also tying local security to national factional competition.

The diversity of PMF components is significant, but it has not eliminated communal tensions. In some areas, Sunni residents accused PMF factions of arbitrary detention, property destruction and preventing displaced families from returning. PMF leaders denied or investigated some allegations, and the Iraqi government announced inquiries. Independent human rights organizations documented abuses, while noting that responsibility varied among units.

History and major engagements

Campaign against the Islamic State

The PMF played a major role in stopping the Islamic State in 2014 and later retaking towns and cities. Its fighters participated in operations around Amerli, Tikrit, Baiji, Fallujah and Mosul. The Iraqi army, federal police, Kurdish forces and international coalition airpower also contributed. The PMF’s local recruitment and willingness to deploy helped compensate for the weakness of regular forces.

In some battles, PMF formations fought alongside Iraqi security forces and received state coordination. In others, factional command remained distinct. The organization’s participation was particularly important in areas where the army lacked reliable units. PMF fighters suffered casualties and became celebrated by state media as defenders of Iraq. This military role strengthened their political status and public influence.

Reports of abuses accompanied several campaigns. After the retaking of Sunni-majority towns, residents and rights organizations reported disappearances, executions, destruction of homes and looting attributed to PMF factions. Some incidents were documented by international organizations; Iraqi authorities announced investigations but accountability was limited. The existence of crimes by particular units does not negate the PMF’s contribution to the defeat of the Islamic State, but that contribution does not excuse abuses against civilians.

After the Islamic State lost its territorial control in Iraq in 2017, the PMF remained in place. The organization’s postwar role expanded into border security, local governance and economic activity. Its continued size and armament prompted debate over demobilization and integration. The government sought to preserve the force’s capacity while asserting greater control over its factions.

Regional activity and foreign operations

Some PMF factions participated in the Syrian civil war in support of Bashar al-Assad’s government. These deployments reflected Iran’s regional strategy and the movement of allied fighters between Iraq and Syria. The participation of Iraqi militias broadened the conflict beyond Syria’s borders and increased sectarian polarization. It also created networks of experience and logistics that continued after the war.

PMF factions have been linked to attacks on United States forces and diplomatic facilities in Iraq. The United States has blamed Iran-aligned militias for rocket and drone attacks. Some groups have claimed responsibility, while others have denied involvement. The Iraqi government has sought to prevent its territory from being used for attacks on foreign forces, but enforcement has been difficult when armed factions retain political influence.

In January 2020, a United States strike near Baghdad airport killed Qasem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s Quds Force, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy head of the PMF Commission and a leader of Kata'ib Hezbollah. The strike sharply escalated tensions and led Iraq’s parliament to call for the departure of foreign forces. The episode highlighted the overlap between Iraqi institutions, Iranian networks and armed groups.

Political influence and state integration

PMF-affiliated factions have become important political actors. Some leaders entered parliament or government, while others supported candidates through allied organizations. Their electoral presence provides a route to influence budgets, appointments and security policy. The relationship between armed formations and political parties is difficult to separate, creating concerns that state institutions may be used to protect factional interests.

Successive Iraqi governments have issued orders requiring PMF units to integrate with the armed forces and refrain from political activity. The orders aimed to establish a single chain of command and distinguish military service from party organization. Compliance has varied. Some factions have adopted official uniforms and reporting structures, while retaining independent authority in practice.

The PMF’s status presents a dilemma for Iraq. Disbanding the force abruptly could alienate veterans and weaken security in areas where the army remains limited. Allowing factions to operate autonomously undermines state sovereignty and creates the risk of armed competition. Integration requires transparent command, payroll oversight, disciplinary procedures and limits on foreign direction.

The 2025 PMF reform debate reflected these unresolved issues. Proposals addressed the organization’s command arrangements, budget and relationship to the national armed forces. Supporters argued that legal clarity was needed to preserve the institution; critics warned that formalizing its power could entrench militia influence. Legislative debate and implementation remain politically sensitive.

Human rights and domestic security

PMF factions have been accused of human rights abuses during counterterrorism operations and in areas under their control. Allegations include arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killing and property seizure. Some claims relate to revenge against people suspected of supporting the Islamic State. Human rights investigations have identified particular units in some cases, while the PMF’s internal accountability procedures have often lacked transparency.

During Iraq’s 2019 protest movement, demonstrators demanding jobs, services and an end to corruption were met with lethal force. Iraqi security forces and armed groups were implicated in killings and intimidation. PMF-linked factions were accused of abducting activists and using violence against protesters. The government announced investigations, but many cases did not result in public accountability.

The PMF’s role in domestic security can blur the line between counterterrorism and political coercion. Units may conduct arrests or enforce security measures without clear public oversight. The Iraqi constitution and laws place limits on detention and use of force, but enforcement is weak where armed groups have political protection. Civil society organizations have called for transparent investigations and protection for journalists and activists.

Abuses have also affected minority communities and displaced people. Reports describe obstacles to returning home, confiscation of property and local control by armed factions. These practices can make displacement permanent and alter local demographics. The Iraqi government has a responsibility to protect residents and ensure that security forces act under law, regardless of the group’s role in defeating the Islamic State.

Relations with Iran and regional alignments

The PMF includes groups with strong ties to Iran. The IRGC’s Quds Force has trained, equipped or supported some factions, especially those that share Tehran’s political outlook. This support has included weapons, funding, advice and strategic coordination. Other PMF units have emphasized Iraqi religious authority and resisted Iranian direction. The organization therefore contains both Iranian-aligned and more nationally oriented elements.

Iran’s influence is a central issue in Iraqi politics. Supporters of cooperation argue that Iran helped defend Iraq against the Islamic State and shares security interests with Baghdad. Critics say Tehran uses armed groups to constrain Iraqi sovereignty and pressure the United States. The evidence shows extensive political and military ties, but the autonomy of individual Iraqi factions varies.

Regional relationships also affect the PMF’s domestic role. Factions can respond to events in Syria, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, and may use Iraqi territory as a strategic corridor. Their activity shapes Iraq’s relations with Arab states and the West. The Iraqi government has attempted to maintain balanced foreign ties, but armed groups sometimes pursue policies that conflict with official diplomacy.

Debate over a national guard

One proposal for resolving the PMF’s status has been the creation of a national guard with regional recruitment and local authority. Supporters argue that such a system could integrate volunteers while preserving community representation and improving security. Opponents worry that regional forces would institutionalize sectarian divisions or become local militias under another name.

The debate reflects broader disagreements about federalism, decentralization and the use of force. Iraq’s central government has struggled to provide security in every region, but local armed forces can weaken national institutions. A workable design would require clear civilian command, transparent budgets and a mechanism to prevent party control.

PMF leaders have generally resisted proposals that could dissolve their organizations or reduce their influence. Government reform efforts have focused on administrative integration and compliance with orders. The gap between formal law and actual command remains a defining challenge.

Assessment

The Popular Mobilization Forces helped Iraq survive the Islamic State’s 2014 offensive and retake territory. Their fighters filled a security vacuum and became a major part of the war effort. The group’s formal incorporation into state structures reflected its importance and gave the government a mechanism for paying and organizing volunteers.

The PMF’s continued autonomy creates serious risks. Armed factions with political influence can challenge the state, attack civilians or foreign forces and evade accountability. Iranian support has strengthened some groups and complicated Iraq’s efforts to pursue an independent foreign policy. The PMF is therefore both a security asset and a contested power center.

The future of the organization will depend on whether Iraq can establish effective civilian command and enforce common rules across all factions. Successful integration would require reliable discipline, a transparent budget and accountability for abuses. Without those measures, the PMF’s legal state status may coexist with the parallel authority that it was intended to resolve.