Ariel Sharon

Ariel Sharon was an Israeli military commander and politician who served as prime minister from 2001 to 2006. He fought in Israel’s founding war, commanded forces in later conflicts and became known for aggressive military operations. After a long political career, he led the Likud party to power and later founded Kadima. His premiership included the Second Intifada, the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and his incapacitating stroke in 2006.

Sharon’s military decisions and political record were highly controversial. Supporters credited him with bold leadership and strategic initiative; critics accused him of excessive force and responsibility for failures to protect civilians. An Israeli commission found him personally responsible for ignoring the danger of a massacre in Beirut’s Sabra and Shatila camps in 1982. His later decision to withdraw Israeli settlements and forces from Gaza marked a sharp shift from his earlier support for settlement expansion.

His career reflected the close relationship between military service, settlement policy and electoral politics in Israel. Sharon moved between the army and government, serving as minister of defense, agriculture and infrastructure. He combined a reputation for unilateral action with a willingness late in life to alter policies he had championed for decades.

Early life and education

Sharon was born Ariel Scheinerman in 1928 in Kfar Malal, an agricultural moshav under British rule. His parents, Shmuel and Vera, had immigrated from the Russian Empire. The family worked the land, and Sharon grew up in a rural community shaped by collective organization and self-defense. He joined the Haganah as a teenager and participated in local security duties.

During the 1948 war, Sharon served in the Alexandroni Brigade and was wounded in fighting near Latrun. He later studied history and Middle Eastern studies at Hebrew University and law at Tel Aviv University. His military responsibilities often interrupted his education. He adopted the surname Sharon, which became associated with his public career.

Sharon married Margalit Zimmermann in 1953. She died in a car accident in 1962. Their son Gur died in a shooting accident in 1967. Sharon later married Margalit’s sister, Lily, and they had two sons, Omri and Gilad. Family tragedy and his intense focus on military and political work affected his private life.

Military career

In 1953, Sharon formed and commanded Unit 101, a special operations unit created to respond to cross-border attacks. The unit conducted raids in Jordanian-controlled areas. Its October 1953 attack on the village of Qibya killed dozens of civilians after houses were destroyed. Israel said the operation targeted armed infiltrators; international condemnation focused on civilian deaths. Sharon maintained that the unit believed residents had fled.

Unit 101 was later integrated into the paratroopers brigade. Sharon served in the 1956 Suez campaign and fought in the Sinai Peninsula. During the Six-Day War in 1967, he commanded an armored division that played a major role in the capture of Egyptian positions in Sinai. He became known for operational initiative, though his willingness to take risks sometimes brought him into conflict with senior commanders.

During the War of Attrition after 1967, Sharon argued for offensive action against Egyptian positions. In 1971, as commander of the Southern Command, he led a campaign against armed cells in Gaza. Israeli forces arrested suspected militants, demolished homes and imposed curfews. The operation reduced attacks but caused civilian displacement and drew criticism from human-rights advocates.

In the 1973 war, Sharon commanded an armored division on the southern front. His forces crossed the Suez Canal into Egypt, helping encircle the Egyptian Third Army. The crossing became a decisive military maneuver and strengthened Sharon’s reputation. Photographs of him with a bandaged head became iconic. The war also led to a public inquiry into military preparedness and contributed to later political changes.

Entry into politics

Sharon retired from active military service in 1973 and entered politics. He helped form the Likud alliance, which brought together Herut and other right-wing parties. In the 1973 election he won a seat in the Knesset, but soon left parliament to serve as a special adviser to prime minister Yitzhak Rabin on security matters.

After Likud’s victory in 1977, prime minister Menachem Begin appointed Sharon minister of agriculture. He expanded government support for Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, arguing they were essential to security and historical rights. The settlement program changed the region’s political geography and became a major obstacle in negotiations with Arab leaders.

Sharon served as minister of defense from 1981. He presented a plan to reshape Lebanon’s political order and remove the PLO’s armed infrastructure from Beirut. Critics argued that the plan went beyond stopping attacks on northern Israel and sought to impose a friendly government in Lebanon. The cabinet’s approval of the invasion was based on a narrower stated objective.

1982 Lebanon War

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon after an attempted assassination of its ambassador in London. Sharon oversaw the campaign, which advanced to Beirut and besieged the city. The Israeli government said its objective was to remove armed forces from range of northern Israeli communities. The operation extended well beyond the initial limited distance and resulted in a prolonged occupation.

In August, the PLO leadership and fighters evacuated Beirut under an internationally supervised agreement. Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated in September. Phalangist militiamen then entered the Sabra and Shatila camps and killed hundreds of civilians. Israeli forces controlled the surrounding area and permitted the militia’s entry.

The Kahan Commission, established by the Israeli government, concluded that Israel bore indirect responsibility for the massacre and found Sharon personally responsible for failing to take appropriate measures to prevent it. Sharon resigned as defense minister but remained in the cabinet. The commission’s findings became a major part of his public legacy and generated mass protests in Israel.

Sharon later served as minister without portfolio and minister of trade and industry. He returned to the cabinet in different roles, remaining a powerful figure within Likud. His reputation as a military strategist continued to attract both electoral support and opposition.

Political career from 1990 to 2001

In the 1990s, Sharon served as minister of housing and construction, overseeing a major housing program for immigrants from the former Soviet Union. He also held portfolios related to infrastructure and national development. The expansion of roads and housing strengthened his standing among voters who favored rapid construction and settlement growth.

Sharon criticized the Oslo Accords signed by the government of Rabin and argued that the agreements threatened Israel’s security. He opposed territorial concessions and warned that the creation of a Ramallah-based Arab administration would enable attacks. In 1998, he became foreign minister in the government of Benjamin Netanyahu and represented Israel in negotiations with the United States and Arab governments.

In September 2000, Sharon visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, accompanied by a large security detail. The visit was widely seen by Arab leaders as provocative and helped trigger protests that escalated into the Second Intifada. Sharon and his supporters argued that the site was open to Jewish visitors and that he had not intended to provoke violence. The event became a flashpoint in the political crisis.

Prime minister (2001–2006)

Sharon became prime minister after defeating Ehud Barak in a special election in 2001. His government faced suicide bombings, shootings and other attacks during the Second Intifada. Israeli forces launched operations in the West Bank, imposed closures and constructed a security barrier. The government said these measures reduced attacks; critics argued they imposed severe restrictions on civilian movement and harmed economic life.

In 2002, Israel carried out Operation Defensive Shield after a series of attacks, including the Passover massacre in Netanya. The army re-entered major West Bank cities and arrested militants. Fighting in Jenin and other locations caused civilian casualties and damage. Claims of a massacre in Jenin were investigated and found to be exaggerated, though the battle involved intense combat and loss of life.

Sharon’s government expanded construction of the security barrier, which Israel described as a defensive measure. The route largely ran inside the West Bank rather than along the Green Line, separating some residents from farmland, schools and services. In 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion that the barrier’s route in occupied territory and its associated regime were contrary to international law. Israel rejected the opinion and argued that the barrier was temporary and necessary to prevent attacks.

In 2003, Sharon accepted a US-backed road map for peace in principle, while adding reservations. The plan called for an end to violence, reforms by the Ramallah-based Arab administration and steps toward a negotiated state. Implementation stalled amid continued attacks, military operations and disagreement over settlements. Sharon maintained that Israel needed a reliable security partner before making major concessions.

Disengagement from Gaza and Kadima

In 2004, Sharon announced a unilateral disengagement plan. Israel withdrew its military forces and evacuated all Jewish settlements from Gaza in 2005, as well as four settlements in the northern West Bank. The operation involved the removal of thousands of residents, some of whom resisted. Sharon argued that disengagement would reduce friction, improve security and strengthen Israel’s international position.

The withdrawal split Likud. Opponents argued that it rewarded attacks and would allow armed groups to take control. Supporters viewed it as a necessary step that reduced Israel’s direct responsibility for Gaza. After Israeli forces withdrew, Hamas won the 2006 Arab legislative election and took control of Gaza in 2007 following conflict with Fatah. Rockets and other attacks continued, while Israel and Egypt imposed restrictions on movement and goods.

Sharon left Likud in November 2005 and founded Kadima, a centrist party that attracted former Likud and Labor politicians. He planned further unilateral withdrawals and sought a new political alignment. The move represented a major reversal from his prior settlement policy and created uncertainty about the future of the West Bank.

Illness, death and assessment

In January 2006, Sharon suffered a severe stroke and fell into a coma. Ehud Olmert became acting prime minister and later led Kadima to victory in the 2006 election. Sharon remained hospitalized for years, with periodic medical updates. He died in January 2014 at the age of 85 and was buried at his ranch in the Negev beside his wife Lily.

Sharon’s legacy combines military success, political adaptation and serious controversy. Admirers credit him with strengthening Israel’s defenses, responding to attacks and making the Gaza withdrawal. Critics emphasize civilian deaths, the 1982 invasion, his responsibility in the Sabra and Shatila findings and the impact of settlements. His career illustrates the costs of relying on military power and the possibility of changing course when strategic conditions shift.

His later disengagement policy was not a negotiated agreement and did not resolve the conflict. It nonetheless altered the map and forced Israeli politics to confront the removal of settlements. Whether the decision improved Israel’s security remains debated. Sharon’s role in both settlement expansion and withdrawal makes his record unusually difficult to categorize.

Sharon’s political influence continued after his incapacitation. Kadima’s subsequent governments pursued negotiations and security policies shaped by his legacy. His career is studied as a case of military leadership entering politics, where tactical victories, public trust and long-term political outcomes do not always align.

Sharon’s military style favored direct action and rapid movement, but the political effects of operations often lasted longer than the immediate battlefield result. His decisions influenced Israel’s relations with Lebanon, Egypt and the United States, and they affected public expectations about the role of military force. Cabinet colleagues and senior officers sometimes questioned his willingness to consult before acting.

His role in the Gaza disengagement remains a key point of debate. The withdrawal removed Israeli settlements and permanent ground forces, but it was not accompanied by an agreed political settlement. Subsequent events left Israel facing new security challenges from Gaza while supporters of disengagement argued that the move reduced the cost of maintaining settlements. The contrasting phases of his career continue to shape how Israelis assess strategic change.