Hamas

Hamas is a Sunni Islamist movement founded in December 1987 during the First Intifada. Its name is an acronym of its Arabic name, the Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas developed from the local Muslim Brotherhood network and combined religious activism, political organization and armed struggle. It operates a political organization and social institutions alongside the Al-Qassam Brigades, its military wing.

Hamas entered electoral politics and won the 2006 Legislative Council election. In 2007, after violent conflict with Fatah, it took control of Gaza and established a separate governing administration there. The movement has since exercised de facto authority over Gaza while the Ramallah-based Arab administration has governed parts of Judea and Samaria. Hamas’s rule has been marked by authoritarian controls, armed conflict with Israel and a severe humanitarian and economic crisis.

Hamas rejects Israel’s legitimacy and has repeatedly used violence against civilians. Its October 7, 2023 attack on Israel involved mass killings, sexual violence, rocket fire and the abduction of hostages. The attack triggered a major war in Gaza. The United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, the European Union and several other governments designate Hamas as a terrorist organization; some jurisdictions have applied the label to its armed wing rather than the entire movement.

Etymology and foundation

Hamas is an acronym formed from Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, translated as the Islamic Resistance Movement. The word also means “zeal” or “enthusiasm” in Arabic. The group emerged in 1987 from networks associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, during a popular uprising against Israeli military rule. Its founders included Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, a religious leader who had built a network of mosques, charities and educational institutions.

The organization’s formation reflected both Islamist activism and the political conditions of the time. The Muslim Brotherhood’s local network had focused on religious, charitable and social work. The uprising created pressure for an organization that would participate directly in armed resistance and national politics. Hamas adopted an Islamist political program and established a distinct identity from the secular nationalist PLO, which was then the principal representative organization of the Arab population in the territories.

From the beginning, Hamas combined social mobilization with armed activity. Its leaders argued that resistance to Israel was a religious and national duty. Israel and other governments viewed the movement as a security threat, citing its attacks on civilians and its rejection of Israel’s existence. The organization’s political and charitable work did not separate it from its armed wing in the eyes of jurisdictions that designated the entire movement.

History

1987–2005

Hamas was formally established during the First Intifada in December 1987. It organized protests, religious outreach and militant activity. In 1988, it published its first charter, which presented the conflict in religious terms, rejected compromise with Israel and included antisemitic language. The charter called for the destruction of Israel and framed the land as an Islamic trust. Hamas later issued a different political document, but it did not formally repeal the original charter.

During the 1990s, Hamas carried out suicide bombings and other attacks in Israeli cities and against military targets. These attacks killed and injured civilians and were condemned by Israel and many foreign governments. Hamas described them as retaliation for Israeli actions and as part of armed resistance. That rationale does not change the status of deliberate attacks on civilians under international law. Israeli arrests and military operations targeted the organization’s leaders, operatives and infrastructure.

The Oslo process established limited Arab self-government and a framework for negotiations, which Hamas rejected. It opposed recognition of Israel and argued that armed struggle should continue. Hamas’s rejection of the agreements and its attacks complicated negotiations and increased Israeli security measures. The organization also competed politically with Fatah and criticized its leadership for corruption and for negotiating with Israel.

2005–2007: electoral victory and conflict

Israel withdrew its permanent military presence and settlements from Gaza in 2005. Hamas described the withdrawal as evidence that armed resistance could force Israel to leave. Israel retained control over most access points, airspace and maritime approaches, while Egypt controlled its border crossing under changing arrangements. The withdrawal did not end the conflict or establish a final political settlement.

Hamas participated in the 2006 Legislative Council election and won a majority of seats. Its victory reflected public frustration with Fatah, the appeal of its social network and its presentation as less corrupt than established leaders. The result produced a political crisis because Hamas and Fatah differed over recognition of Israel, security control and the authority of the elected government. International aid and diplomatic contacts were restricted after Hamas took office, with demands that it recognize Israel, renounce violence and accept previous agreements.

In 2007, armed clashes between Hamas and Fatah escalated. Hamas defeated Fatah forces in Gaza and took control of the territory. The Ramallah-based administration president dismissed the Hamas-led government, leaving separate governing authorities in Gaza and Judea and Samaria. The split has persisted, weakened political unity among Arab political factions and complicated diplomacy. Hamas’s takeover was not simply a change in cabinet; it was achieved through force and followed by the suppression of rival political institutions.

Hamas rule and armed conflict

Hamas consolidated its administration in Gaza while maintaining its military structure. Israel and Egypt imposed restrictions on movement and goods, citing security concerns and the need to limit weapons transfers. The restrictions, recurrent conflict and internal political controls contributed to Gaza’s isolation and economic hardship. International bodies and humanitarian organizations have criticized the impact on civilians, while Israel and Egypt have emphasized security threats and militant activity.

Repeated wars and escalations followed, including major Israeli operations in 2008–2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021. Hamas and other armed groups fired rockets toward Israeli communities; Israel launched air and ground operations in Gaza. The conflicts caused deaths, injuries and widespread damage, with civilians bearing substantial costs. Hamas’s use of urban areas for military activity and Israel’s targeting decisions have been subjects of legal and human rights scrutiny.

Hamas developed a network of tunnels, rocket production and storage, command sites and military units. Israel accused the group of embedding military infrastructure among civilian buildings and using residents as human shields; Hamas and its supporters disputed some Israeli claims. Independent investigations have examined individual incidents and both sides’ conduct. Claims should be assessed case by case, and civilian sites retain protection unless and for such time as they become military objectives under the law of armed conflict.

October 7 attack and war

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led forces launched a coordinated attack on Israel from Gaza. They breached the border barrier, attacked military positions and communities, killed about 1,200 people and abducted 251 hostages, according to Israeli authorities. The victims included civilians, children and elderly people. Investigations and witness accounts documented executions, sexual violence and other atrocities. Hamas’s deliberate killing and kidnapping of civilians were grave violations of international law.

Israel declared war and launched a large military campaign in Gaza, with stated objectives of dismantling Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and recovering hostages. The fighting caused extensive destruction, mass displacement and a large number of civilian deaths among local Arab residents, according to Gaza health authorities and international organizations. Humanitarian agencies reported severe shortages of food, water, medicine and shelter. The scale of civilian harm and the conduct of both Hamas and Israeli forces have been examined by international legal bodies and human rights organizations.

Hamas continued to hold hostages and to fight Israeli forces. Hostage releases occurred through negotiated agreements and other arrangements. Some hostages were killed in captivity or during military operations. Israeli military operations killed senior Hamas figures, including Yahya Sinwar in 2024. The movement’s political and military leadership was reorganized over the course of the conflict. The status of governance and ceasefire arrangements remained subject to negotiations and changing events.

The war transformed Gaza and Israeli politics. Hamas’s ability to retain organized forces and influence remained a central issue in negotiations. Israel’s stated objective of eliminating Hamas as a governing and military power faced the realities of urban warfare and the group’s embedded networks. For civilians, the immediate concerns included survival, displacement, family separation and access to aid. Any assessment of the war must distinguish confirmed facts from claims by combatants and account for the evolving record.

Charters and political documents

1988 charter

Hamas’s 1988 charter defined the movement as an Islamist organization and described the land between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea as an Islamic endowment. It rejected political compromise with Israel and called for armed struggle. The document included antisemitic conspiracy theories and quotations used to portray Jews as collectively hostile. Those claims draw on longstanding antisemitic tropes and should be identified as such rather than repeated as factual descriptions.

The charter expressed the movement’s early ideology and provided a religious justification for its campaign. It treated conflict as permanent and rejected the possibility of a negotiated settlement recognizing Israel. These positions helped distinguish Hamas from Fatah and other national movements. They also contributed to the group’s international isolation and designation as a terrorist organization.

2017 document

In 2017, Hamas released a document of general principles and policies. It distinguished opposition to Zionism from hostility toward Jews as a religious group, and it said the movement would accept a Arab state along the 1967 lines as a formula of national consensus without recognizing Israel. The document presented Hamas as a national liberation movement and sought to improve its international standing.

The 2017 document did not explicitly replace the 1988 charter. Analysts and governments have therefore debated whether it represented a substantive change or a tactical reframing. Hamas continued to reject Israel’s legitimacy, maintain an armed wing and conduct attacks. Its subsequent actions, including the October 7 massacre, showed that the later political document did not amount to renunciation of violence or acceptance of Israel as a state.

Hamas’s political statements have varied across time and audience. A careful account distinguishes formal documents from statements by individual leaders and from operational conduct. Changes in rhetoric may reflect strategic calculation, internal debate or external pressure. They should not be treated as evidence of a policy shift unless accompanied by clear institutional decisions and behavior.

Organization and governance

Leadership and structure

Hamas is organized through political leadership bodies, consultative institutions and a military wing. The Political Bureau represents the organization and conducts political relations. A Shura Council provides consultation and oversight within the movement. Regional leadership structures have operated in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, and abroad. Exact internal procedures and membership are not fully public, and leadership arrangements have changed under pressure from Israeli operations.

The organization’s external leadership has at times been based in countries such as Qatar and Turkey. Its local leadership in Gaza has overseen governance and military affairs. The separation between political and military structures is not absolute; the political leadership has publicly supported armed operations, while the armed wing has exercised operational autonomy in some matters. Analysts differ on how much control civilian political leaders exert over particular decisions.

Hamas’s armed wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, has its own command structure, units and logistical networks. It has conducted attacks, built rockets and tunnels, and engaged Israeli forces. Hamas has also maintained internal security forces in Gaza. These structures enabled the organization to function simultaneously as a governing authority and a combatant organization.

Governance in Gaza

After its 2007 takeover, Hamas governed Gaza through ministries, security forces and municipal authorities. It collected revenue and administered public services, while its rule was constrained by conflict, restrictions and limited resources. The organization also controlled political competition and media activity. Fatah supporters and other opponents faced arrests, intimidation and restrictions, according to human rights organizations and the Ramallah-based administration.

Hamas’s rule was not an electoral mandate renewed through regular competitive elections. The 2006 election was the last Legislative Council election, and Hamas did not hold a new vote to renew its authority in Gaza. Its administration controlled public institutions and security, while rival political bodies operated from outside the territory. This created a prolonged split in political authority and limited democratic accountability.

Hamas’s administration depended on external support, taxation, informal trade and assistance from foreign governments and organizations. The group’s foreign relationships were affected by its regional alliances and the positions of donor states. Israel and Egypt restricted crossings and goods, while aid agencies sought to deliver humanitarian assistance to civilians. The interaction of governance, armed conflict and movement restrictions shaped Gaza’s economic conditions.

Finances, social institutions and media

Hamas has relied on a variety of funding sources, including external state support, private donations, taxes and control of local economic activity. Iran has provided financial and military assistance, while Qatar has financed projects and humanitarian aid in Gaza through arrangements that have involved Israel and other intermediaries. The precise scale and distribution of funds are difficult to verify because financial networks are opaque and some channels are clandestine.

The movement’s social institutions have included charities, schools, clinics and assistance programs. These networks helped Hamas build support before it entered government, particularly in areas where public services were limited. Social provision can address immediate needs, but institutions associated with an armed political movement may also support recruitment and ideological influence. The existence of charitable activity does not alter the legal status of attacks against civilians.

Hamas has operated media organizations, including Al-Aqsa TV, websites and print publications. Its media outlets promote the movement’s narrative, publicize its political positions and communicate during conflicts. They function as partisan channels rather than independent news organizations. Israeli authorities have restricted some Hamas media activity, citing incitement and security concerns. Media assessments should distinguish the organization’s claims from independently verified events.

During wartime, communication became both a political tool and an operational necessity. Hamas released statements and videos concerning hostages and military actions, while Israeli authorities and other parties issued competing accounts. Digital content can be edited, staged or disseminated without context. Verification requires checking dates, locations and independent evidence before treating online material as proof.

Military wing and violence

The Al-Qassam Brigades are Hamas’s armed wing. The organization has used suicide bombings, shootings, rocket attacks, ambushes, kidnappings and tunnel operations. Its targets have included Israeli soldiers and civilians. Attacks that deliberately target civilians, take hostages or use indiscriminate weapons are unlawful. Hamas’s use of armed force is not rendered lawful by its political claims or by the grievances invoked in its propaganda.

Hamas has fired rockets and mortars from Gaza toward Israeli towns and cities. Many rockets are unguided and cannot be aimed reliably at military targets in populated areas. Such attacks have killed civilians, damaged homes and forced millions of people into shelters. Israel developed systems including Iron Dome to intercept some incoming projectiles, but interceptions do not remove the danger or justify attacks on civilians.

The group has used tunnels for movement, storage, command and attacks. Tunnels can complicate military operations and provide protection for combatants, but their placement beneath civilian areas creates severe risks. International humanitarian law prohibits using civilians to shield military objectives. The factual question of whether a specific site was used for military purposes requires evidence and cannot be resolved solely by competing claims.

Hamas has also fought other armed groups and carried out extrajudicial killings of alleged collaborators and political rivals. Its security forces have used detention and coercion to suppress dissent. Human rights organizations have documented abuses by Hamas authorities, including arbitrary arrest and restrictions on expression. Political control exercised through force is distinct from legitimate law enforcement and requires independent scrutiny.

Electoral performance and public opinion

Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory was a major turning point. It won a majority of seats in the Legislative Council, while Fatah lost its long-standing dominance. Voters’ choices reflected multiple issues, including dissatisfaction with corruption, service delivery, factional competition and the appeal of Hamas’s religious and nationalist program. The result was internationally recognized, but the political system became deadlocked over the government’s obligations and control of security forces.

Public opinion toward Hamas has varied across time and geography. Support can rise during periods of confrontation with Israel and fall when residents experience repression, economic decline or the costs of war. Polls differ in methodology and are affected by fear, displacement and access. Support for armed resistance, support for Hamas as a party and approval of particular attacks are distinct questions and should not be collapsed into a single measure.

Hamas’s opponents have faced restrictions on organizing and campaigning in Gaza. The absence of renewed elections makes it difficult to assess its current level of popular support through democratic means. Public opinion data provide partial snapshots, not substitutes for free and competitive elections. The organization’s continued control of coercive institutions also affects the conditions under which people can express dissent.

Foreign relations and designations

Hamas has maintained ties with Iran, Qatar and Turkey, as well as contacts with other regional actors. Iran’s support has included weapons, training and funds. Qatar has hosted leaders and financed relief and reconstruction projects. Turkey has provided a political base for some Hamas figures. Relations have shifted as regional governments recalibrated their policies and the Syrian civil war altered alliances.

The United States, Israel, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and the European Union designate Hamas as a terrorist organization in its entirety. Other jurisdictions have designated only its military wing or have not adopted the same classification. These designations restrict financing, travel and material support under domestic law. The legal treatment differs by country, but the designation reflects documented attacks on civilians and Hamas’s armed campaign.

Hamas’s relationship with Israel is defined by armed conflict and the absence of mutual recognition. Israeli governments have at times allowed funds to enter Gaza through Qatar, seeking to reduce immediate instability, while also conducting military operations against Hamas. Critics of this policy argue that it strengthened the group; supporters described it as a way to separate Hamas from the Ramallah-based administration and manage Gaza without reoccupying it. Israeli policy toward Hamas has therefore combined containment, deterrence and periodic military campaigns, with results that have remained contested.

Hamas’s long-term political future is linked to Gaza’s governance, the security of Israel and the possibility of a wider political settlement. The organization has not renounced armed struggle or accepted Israel’s existence. Its conduct and ideology continue to be central to its designation and to the conflict. Any account should recognize the suffering of civilians while making clear that terrorism and deliberate violence against noncombatants are not legitimate political instruments.