Rapid Support Forces

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a Sudanese paramilitary organization led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti. The force emerged from militia networks mobilized during the Darfur conflict and was formalized by the government of Omar al-Bashir in 2013. It became a powerful national institution with its own command, commercial interests and foreign relationships. In April 2023, a dispute between the RSF and Sudan’s regular armed forces erupted into a nationwide war.

The RSF’s rise reflected the strategy of Sudan’s former government to create parallel security bodies that could counterbalance the regular army and protect the ruling order. It fought in Darfur and deployed abroad, including to Yemen, while its leadership expanded into gold trading and other businesses. After Bashir’s removal in 2019, the RSF became a decisive actor in the country’s political transition. Its leaders later entered a violent struggle with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), bringing devastation to Khartoum, Darfur and other regions.

International organizations and news investigations have documented grave abuses attributed to RSF fighters, including killings, sexual violence, looting and forced displacement. In Darfur, observers have reported ethnically targeted attacks against non-Arab communities. The force and its leaders have denied some allegations or disputed responsibility. The fighting has generated one of the world’s largest displacement and humanitarian emergencies, while efforts to secure a ceasefire have repeatedly failed.

Origins in Darfur

The RSF’s roots lie in the conflict that began in Darfur in 2003. Sudan’s government armed local militias to suppress insurgent groups and defend state authority in a region where communities had long competed over land, water and political representation. These forces became notorious for attacks on civilians and village destruction. The label applied to them in public debate became associated with mass atrocities, though the networks were diverse and changed over time.

In 2013, Bashir’s government reorganized a number of these fighters into the Rapid Support Forces. The new body was placed under the National Intelligence and Security Service rather than the army, giving the president a separate armed instrument. It received official legal status through legislation in 2017 and developed a command structure under Hemedti, who had built influence in Darfur. The reorganization gave militia forces a formal institutional identity without fully integrating them into the regular armed forces.

The force was deployed against insurgents in Darfur and other parts of Sudan. Its fighters were also used in border operations and internal security missions. Reports by rights groups and journalists described attacks on civilians, arbitrary detention and looting during counterinsurgency campaigns. The government presented the RSF as a force for stability and border control; critics viewed it as a presidential guard with a record of violence and limited accountability.

Hemedti’s ascent transformed the organization. He had a direct relationship with Bashir and access to economic resources generated by military campaigns and commerce. The RSF’s command structure remained personally associated with him and his family networks. Its power was unusual for a paramilitary institution: it possessed heavy weaponry, its own recruitment channels, financial assets and a public profile separate from the army.

Leadership, structure and resources

The RSF is commanded by Hemedti, with senior roles held by members of his family and trusted associates. Its units include mobile forces that can be deployed across long distances. Recruitment has drawn on Darfur and other regions, with fighters connected through local, tribal and commercial networks. Estimates of its strength vary, and its numbers changed during the war as it recruited, suffered casualties and lost or gained territory.

The organization has had a flexible structure that combines formal ranks with personal loyalty and local command relationships. Its mobility and experience in desert warfare were assets in the early stages of the conflict. It could deploy quickly and rely on supply routes outside the normal defense ministry system. Those qualities also made unified command and external oversight difficult.

Commercial activity helped finance the RSF and its leadership. Gold mining and trading in Darfur became a major source of wealth, alongside contracts, companies and control over parts of the transport economy. The RSF’s business network included firms linked to Hemedti’s family. Analysts have described these resources as a foundation for autonomy from the state budget and as a means to sustain an armed institution in competition with the army.

The RSF also recruited Sudanese fighters for foreign deployments. Its forces took part in the Saudi-led coalition’s campaign in Yemen, where Sudanese units were paid to serve on front lines. The deployment brought revenue and combat experience, but also controversy over recruitment and the use of young fighters. The pattern reflected a broader outsourcing of military labor by regional powers engaged in conflicts abroad.

Political role after 2019

When demonstrations forced Bashir from power in April 2019, the RSF’s leaders became central to the new balance of authority. Hemedti joined the Transitional Military Council and later served as deputy head of the Sovereignty Council, the body created to share power with civilian representatives. The arrangement was intended to guide Sudan toward civilian rule, but military leaders retained control over security institutions and economic assets.

On 3 June 2019, security forces violently dispersed a sit-in outside the military headquarters in Khartoum. The operation killed and injured demonstrators and involved widespread abuses. The RSF was widely accused of leading the assault, though authorities contested responsibility and the chain of command. The event shattered trust between civilian leaders and the security establishment and became a defining episode in the transitional period.

A power-sharing agreement later formalized a civilian-military transition. Hemedti retained a senior role, and the RSF remained institutionally separate from the army. Disputes over accountability, control of security forces and the timing of elections weakened the arrangement. In October 2021, the military and RSF removed civilian leaders and took control, provoking protests and international condemnation.

The coup deepened competition within the security establishment. The SAF commander, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and Hemedti disagreed over the future of the transition and the integration of the RSF into the army. The question of how quickly, under whose command and on what terms the paramilitary would be absorbed became a central issue. Both sides built military positions and prepared for confrontation.

War with the Sudanese Armed Forces

Fighting between the RSF and the SAF began in Khartoum on 15 April 2023 and spread rapidly across Sudan. The competing forces blamed each other for starting the battle. The RSF seized positions in the capital, including residential districts and public buildings, while the SAF used air power and artillery. Urban warfare destroyed infrastructure and placed civilians at acute risk as neighborhoods became battle zones.

The conflict expanded to Darfur, Kordofan and other regions. RSF forces used their mobility to capture towns, roads and military installations. The SAF retained aircraft, heavy equipment and control over parts of the state bureaucracy. Both sides have received allegations of indiscriminate attacks and violations of international humanitarian law. The collapse of policing and courts enabled looting, detention and violence against civilians.

In Darfur, RSF fighters and allied militias attacked communities associated with African ethnic groups. In El Geneina, West Darfur, survivors and investigators described mass killings and forced displacement of the Masalit population in 2023. These atrocities revived patterns of violence from the earlier war and raised warnings of renewed mass killing. The RSF denied that its command ordered ethnic attacks, while investigations have connected fighters and allied forces to the violence.

The RSF’s capture of El Fasher in October 2025 marked a major shift in the conflict. El Fasher had been the last major state-held city in Darfur and a refuge for civilians displaced by fighting. Reports following the capture described killings, sexual violence, looting and mass flight. Humanitarian organizations warned that access was blocked and communications disrupted, limiting independent assessment. The event intensified international calls for protection of civilians and accountability.

Khartoum’s population endured repeated displacement, shortages and destruction of hospitals, schools and utilities. Many residents fled to safer parts of Sudan or across borders. Aid agencies struggled to deliver food and medicine amid insecurity, checkpoints and restrictions. The war also damaged agricultural production and trade, contributing to hunger and famine risk in multiple locations.

Foreign relations and external deployments

The RSF’s international relationships grew from its role in border control, migration enforcement and foreign military deployments. European governments cooperated with Sudanese authorities on migration management before Bashir’s fall, and RSF forces were assigned to patrol remote borders. Rights groups warned that partnering with a force accused of abuses risked legitimizing it and exposing migrants to exploitation or violence.

The Yemen deployment connected the RSF to the Saudi-led coalition and its campaign against the Houthi movement. Sudanese fighters served alongside forces from other coalition states and received financial compensation. The experience gave the RSF combat exposure beyond Sudan. It also strengthened Hemedti’s political and economic ties with Gulf actors, although foreign relationships were shaped by changing regional interests and were often disputed.

The force has operated near Sudan’s borders with Chad, Libya and Ethiopia, where routes for weapons, fighters and supplies have shifted with the war. Its leaders cultivated contacts with neighboring actors and political figures. Sudan’s conflict is therefore intertwined with regional competition and cross-border commerce. Allegations of outside support have been repeatedly reported and denied by implicated governments, making independent verification difficult.

Reports have described RSF activity in Libya and connections to armed networks there. Libya’s divided political environment created routes and relationships useful to multiple Sudanese actors. The RSF has also been linked in reporting to foreign mercenary networks and Russian-linked operators. Such ties changed over time and should be distinguished from direct command or formal alliances.

Kenya and other African states have hosted diplomatic meetings involving Sudanese political actors. In 2025, RSF representatives participated in the formation of a political coalition and a rival administration structure, which the SAF-aligned authorities rejected. The move raised concerns that Sudan could fragment into competing governments and deepen the war. Regional organizations have struggled to mediate, with disagreements over representation, ceasefire terms and accountability.

Human rights record and accountability

The RSF has been implicated in a wide range of abuses, including killings, rape, torture, arbitrary detention, looting and forced displacement. Human Rights Watch, the United Nations and other investigators have documented patterns across Darfur and the 2023 war. The organization’s command has denied systematic wrongdoing, blamed rogue fighters or attributed crimes to the other side. Independent investigations have faced obstacles because sites are inaccessible, witnesses fear reprisals and evidence can be destroyed.

Sexual violence has been reported in Khartoum and Darfur, including rape used to terrorize civilians. Survivors face stigma, insecurity and a shortage of medical care. Humanitarian workers have described attacks on women and girls and the use of sexual violence in areas under RSF control. Documentation is incomplete because many survivors cannot safely report crimes, and support services have been disrupted by the war.

The force has also been accused of looting homes, businesses and aid supplies. Residents have reported forced recruitment, extortion and the occupation of civilian buildings. The use of homes and hospitals for military purposes exposes civilians to attack and violates the principle of distinction. The SAF has likewise been accused of abuses, including air attacks that killed civilians, but this does not lessen the distinct responsibility of RSF commanders and fighters for crimes committed by their forces.

Accountability has been hindered by Sudan’s fractured institutions and the scale of the war. The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over crimes in Darfur, while UN mechanisms have gathered evidence and named patterns of violation. Sanctions by the United States and other governments have targeted RSF leaders and associated companies. Investigators have called for preservation of evidence, protection for witnesses and independent access to affected areas.

Historical significance

The RSF illustrates the consequences of building parallel armed forces outside a unified national command. Bashir’s government used the organization to counterbalance the army and extend control into peripheral regions. That strategy gave the RSF institutional resources and political leverage, but it also created a rival center of force that the state could not easily subordinate. After the transition began, disputes over integration became a direct driver of war.

The organization’s future remains bound to Sudan’s political settlement. A durable peace would require security-sector reform, transparent management of commercial assets, accountability for abuses and credible civilian authority. Disarmament and integration cannot be achieved solely through a formal agreement if commanders retain autonomous funding and recruitment networks. The RSF’s role in the war and documented crimes will remain central to any assessment of Sudan’s transition and prospects for national unity.