Islamic Jihad Movement

The Islamic Jihad Movement is a Sunni Islamist militant organization founded in the late 1970s. It is based chiefly in Gaza and maintains a smaller presence in Judea and Samaria. The group rejects negotiations and political compromise with Israel, advocating armed struggle as its primary means of achieving its objectives. Its armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades, has carried out rocket attacks, bombings, shootings and other operations.

The movement developed from Islamist activism influenced by the Iranian Revolution and regional political movements. Unlike Hamas, it has not built a comparable political party or taken part in Ramallah-based administration elections. It has instead concentrated on armed activity and ideological mobilization, while maintaining a limited network of social institutions. Its leadership has operated both locally and from abroad, and the group has received financial and military support from Iran.

The United States and several other governments designate the organization as a terrorist group. Its attacks have killed and injured Israeli civilians and soldiers. The group has also taken part in wider conflicts involving Israel and Hamas, including rocket fire from Gaza. Its continuing armed operations and opposition to Israel’s existence make it a significant actor in the regional conflict, despite its smaller size relative to Hamas.

History and background

The organization emerged in the late 1970s among Islamist activists who believed that religious and political mobilization should be directed toward armed struggle against Israel. Its early figures included Fathi Shaqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda. Shaqaqi studied medicine and became influenced by the Iranian Revolution, the writings of Islamist thinkers and the conflict in the region. The organization’s development reflected a debate within Islamist circles about whether social preaching and gradual political change could achieve national aims.

Its founders viewed armed action as more urgent than building an electoral party. They criticized the PLO’s secular nationalism and diplomatic strategy, and they rejected the peace process that emerged in the 1990s. The movement sought to create a small, disciplined organization capable of attacks, recruitment and propaganda, rather than a broad political coalition. This decision shaped its limited political footprint and its reliance on covert cells.

The group’s formative period overlapped with the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which demonstrated that an Islamist movement could overthrow a secular government and establish a religious political order. The Islamic Jihad Movement drew inspiration from the revolution without becoming institutionally identical to Iran’s Shiite state. It is a Sunni organization, and its doctrinal tradition differs from that of the Iranian leadership. Its relationship with Tehran has been strategic, based on opposition to Israel and support for armed groups.

In the 1980s, the group built networks and carried out attacks against Israeli military targets and civilians. Israeli authorities arrested or expelled leaders, and the organization’s leadership shifted between Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon and other locations. Shaqaqi was assassinated in Malta in 1995. The group blamed Israel, while Israeli officials did not publicly confirm responsibility at the time. His death elevated the role of later leaders and reinforced the movement’s clandestine character.

During the First Intifada and the years that followed, the movement competed with Hamas and other factions for recruits and influence. It rejected the Oslo agreements and opposed recognition of Israel. Its armed operations intensified during periods of negotiation, which the group viewed as concessions without a guarantee of independence. Israeli security operations targeted its networks and commanders, while the organization continued to launch attacks and recruit new members.

Post-intifada period and armed campaigns

After the Second Intifada began in 2000, the organization carried out suicide bombings and shootings, including attacks on Israeli civilians. These operations were condemned by Israel and many governments. Deliberate attacks on civilians are unlawful regardless of the political cause claimed by an armed group. The movement described its actions as resistance and retaliation, but that framing does not make indiscriminate or intentional violence against civilians legitimate.

Israel’s withdrawal of settlements and permanent ground forces from Gaza in 2005 did not end rocket fire or the wider conflict. The movement continued to operate from Gaza and fire rockets toward Israeli communities. Its leaders claimed the attacks demonstrated continued resistance and pressured Israel. The rockets were often unguided and could not reliably distinguish between military and civilian targets. Their use therefore placed Israeli civilians at recurring risk.

Following Hamas’s seizure of Gaza in 2007, the Islamic Jihad Movement retained its independent armed organization and sometimes cooperated with Hamas. The two groups shared an opposition to Israel but differed in strategy: Hamas governed the territory and engaged in political bargaining, while Islamic Jihad rejected electoral participation and prioritized armed operations. Their coordination could be tactical and limited; each retained separate leadership, command structures and external relationships.

The movement participated in repeated escalations, including rocket exchanges in 2012, 2014, 2019, 2021 and 2022. Israeli airstrikes targeted commanders and infrastructure. In some campaigns, the group fired hundreds of rockets, while Israel stated that its air defenses intercepted many of them. Casualties and damage varied by conflict. The movement’s operations were often followed by short ceasefires brokered by Egypt or other intermediaries, without resolving the underlying conflict.

During the 2023–2025 war period, the organization remained an armed actor in Gaza and participated in fighting against Israel. It was among the armed groups involved in the October 7 attacks, and some of its members were reported to have taken hostages. The group’s involvement in the assault was part of a wider operation led by Hamas. The attack’s killings and abductions of civilians were grave crimes and intensified the military campaign that followed.

The Islamic Jihad Movement maintained rocket fire and armed activity during the war, while its commanders and infrastructure were targeted by Israeli forces. The scale of destruction in Gaza and civilian suffering were extensive. The group’s military presence among civilian neighborhoods increased risks to residents, while Israeli operations also faced legal obligations to distinguish civilians from combatants and take precautions. Each incident requires evidence-specific assessment rather than generalization from either party’s statements.

Ideology, motives and objectives

The group’s ideology combines Sunni Islamist thought with a nationalist focus on Israel. It portrays the conflict as a religious obligation and rejects Israel’s right to exist. The movement argues that armed struggle is necessary and that negotiations entrench an unjust status quo. It treats resistance as the defining activity of its organization and gives comparatively little emphasis to conventional political participation.

The organization’s worldview has been shaped by Arab nationalist writers, Islamist revolutionary movements and the Iranian Revolution. Its leaders have cited the liberation of the land and establishment of Islamic rule as long-term aims. The precise institutional form envisioned for any future political order has been less developed than its opposition to Israel and its commitment to armed activity. Its public declarations generally prioritize struggle over detailed governance plans.

Despite its Sunni identity, the movement’s relationship with Shiite Iran has been close. This partnership is based on shared strategic interests and material assistance rather than identical theology. Iran has supported the group financially and militarily, and it has been linked to a broader network of armed organizations including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other regional partners. The scale of control Iran exercises over the movement’s operational decisions is contested; the organization has its own leadership and local priorities.

The group’s rhetoric has included anti-Jewish statements and conspiratorial claims. These statements should be described as antisemitic when they assign collective blame to Jews or rely on fabricated plots. Opposition to Israeli policy does not justify hostility toward Jews as a group. The movement’s founding ideology and public propaganda have at times blurred that distinction, while some later statements have focused more narrowly on Israel and Zionism.

The movement’s political aims have not translated into broad electoral mobilization. It has not sought to win government through the ballot box and has rejected the elections of the Legislative Council. This position sets it apart from Hamas, whose electoral victory in 2006 and subsequent rule in Gaza changed the political system. Islamic Jihad has remained a militant organization outside formal governmental structures.

Organization and leadership

The organization is headed by a secretary-general and overseen by a leadership council. Regional and external offices have been used to maintain political contacts, fundraising and operational coordination. Its leadership has at times resided outside Gaza, which can provide security but also creates distance from local conditions. Internal decision-making is secretive, and available information about its membership and command hierarchy is incomplete.

Fathi Shaqaqi was an influential founder and early secretary-general. After his assassination, Ramadan Shalah led the movement from 1995 until 2018. Ziyad al-Nakhalah then became secretary-general. Leadership transitions have been shaped by Israeli operations, illness, exile and internal succession. Public sources do not always provide consistent details about the composition of senior councils or how authority is distributed between internal and external leaders.

The Al-Quds Brigades are the movement’s armed wing. They organize fighters, plan attacks and maintain rocket and weapons capabilities. Their units have operated in Gaza and Judea and Samaria, though Israeli security operations have disrupted networks in the latter. The armed wing is central to the organization’s identity and public messaging. Its actions are not detached from the political leadership, which has praised and claimed responsibility for operations.

The group’s size is difficult to establish. Estimates of fighters and weapons vary, and the organization does not provide independently verifiable totals. Its capabilities include rockets, explosives, small arms and local production. Iranian support has helped develop military capacity, but actual inventory and readiness depend on supply routes, Israeli interdiction and wartime attrition.

Recruitment has drawn on ideological commitment, local networks and opposition to Israel. The organization has recruited young men, including minors in some cases, and its military activities have raised concerns about child recruitment. International law prohibits the recruitment and use of children in hostilities. Public reports on individual cases must be checked carefully, but the broader risk is associated with armed groups operating in densely populated environments.

Activities and attacks

The movement’s armed campaign has included shootings, bombings, suicide attacks, rocket launches and attempted attacks on Israeli forces. Some attacks targeted soldiers or military installations; others struck civilian targets or used methods incapable of distinguishing civilians from combatants. The distinction matters legally and historically. A summary should neither excuse attacks because they were described as resistance nor imply that every claimed operation had the same target or outcome.

Rocket attacks have been a recurring tactic. The weapons have ranged from locally made short-range rockets to more capable systems reportedly supplied or developed with outside support. Launches from Gaza have led to Israeli warnings, air-defense interceptions and retaliatory strikes. Rocket fire has disrupted schools, workplaces and ordinary life in Israeli communities. It has also contributed to repeated escalations that brought severe consequences for residents of Gaza.

The movement has claimed responsibility for attacks or issued statements afterward. Claims of responsibility may be intended to demonstrate capacity, compete with other groups or influence negotiations. They do not alone establish complete details of an operation. Independent reporting, government investigations and physical evidence provide additional ways to assess claims.

Israeli military operations have killed group leaders and fighters. In 2019, an Israeli strike killed senior commander Bahaa Abu al-Ata in Gaza, prompting a round of rocket attacks. In 2022, Israeli strikes killed senior commanders Khaled Mansour and Taysir al-Jabari during another escalation. The movement responded with rockets. These events illustrate the cycle of targeted strikes and retaliation that has repeatedly intensified conflict without producing a durable settlement.

The movement’s armed wing has also operated in coordination with Hamas and other groups. Coordination can involve simultaneous rocket launches or shared battlefield objectives, but the groups maintain separate command systems. The broader armed network in Gaza has included formations supported by Iran and groups with distinct political identities. Hamas has been the dominant governing and military organization in the territory.

Social services and funding

The organization has maintained a limited social-services network compared with Hamas. These services have included charitable aid and support for families connected to the movement. Social work can help establish local legitimacy and sustain recruitment networks, but the movement’s main organizational investment has remained in its armed activity. The scale and reach of its institutions are not independently documented in a comprehensive way.

Iran has been the most significant external source of support. Funding and military assistance have helped the organization maintain operations despite sanctions, Israeli interdiction and losses in conflict. Transfer mechanisms have included regional networks and intermediaries. The exact value and channels are difficult to verify, and estimates should be attributed to the institutions that produce them.

Funding also comes from donations and networks sympathetic to the group. Governments have imposed financial restrictions, investigated alleged support channels and criminalized material assistance. These measures aim to disrupt the group’s ability to plan and execute attacks. Humanitarian aid for civilians in Gaza is distinct from financial or material support to an armed organization and should not be conflated.

Foreign relations and designation

The Islamic Jihad Movement has maintained close ties with Iran and received support from regional partners. It has had representatives in Lebanon, Syria and other locations at different times. Its external relationships have provided access to funding, political contacts and logistical support. Those ties have also exposed the group to changes in regional policy and to pressure from governments seeking to limit Iran’s influence.

The United States designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997. The European Union, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Israel have also proscribed or designated it under their respective legal systems. These measures restrict funding and travel and criminalize certain forms of material support. Legal categories vary by jurisdiction but reflect the group’s record of attacks on civilians and its continued use of violence.

International reporting has described the organization as one of the armed factions in Gaza alongside Hamas and smaller groups. It has sometimes coordinated operations with Hamas, but the two have not merged. Hamas’s government controlled administrative institutions in Gaza, while Islamic Jihad retained its separate armed command and rejected formal political participation. Their cooperation has therefore been operational rather than a unified governmental structure.

The movement’s future is tied to the trajectory of the conflict, its external support and the state of armed groups in Gaza. Israel regards its military capacity as a continuing threat and has targeted its leadership and infrastructure. The organization has maintained its ideological rejection of Israel and its commitment to armed struggle. These positions leave little space for political compromise and contribute to recurring violence.