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The War of Attrition was fought mainly between Egypt and Israel from 1967 to 1970. Egypt sought to recover the Sinai Peninsula, which Israel had taken during the Six-Day War. The conflict consisted of artillery duels, air strikes, commando raids and battles along the Suez Canal. Jordanian, Soviet and other forces were also involved at different stages.
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser believed that sustained military pressure would force Israel or the international community to arrange an Israeli withdrawal. Israel answered Egyptian attacks with artillery, air power, raids and deep-penetration strikes. The fighting grew more intense in 1969 and 1970, when Soviet military personnel and air-defense systems supported Egypt. An American diplomatic initiative produced a ceasefire in August 1970, though both sides soon accused the other of violating its terms.
The ceasefire left the front line where it had been at the start of the conflict: Israel held the eastern bank of the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula, while Egypt remained on the western side. The war caused substantial military and civilian losses and tested Israel's ability to withstand a sustained campaign. Egypt used the ceasefire to rebuild its armed forces before launching the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel later returned Sinai to Egypt under the 1979 peace treaty.
Egyptian front
Israel's victory in 1967 had left Sinai under Israeli control up to the Suez Canal. Egypt rejected the loss of the peninsula and sought both to restore its military reputation and to compel a withdrawal. The first postwar clashes were intermittent. Egypt used artillery against Israeli positions, while Israeli forces responded with air attacks and raids. On 21 October 1967, Egyptian missile boats sank the Israeli destroyer INS Eilat, killing 47 sailors. Israel retaliated against Egyptian oil installations near Suez.
Egypt gradually increased pressure along the canal, using heavy artillery, aircraft and Soviet assistance. Its objective was to make the Israeli position costly to hold and demonstrate that the 1967 lines could not become a stable settlement. Israel constructed the Bar-Lev Line, a network of defensive positions on the canal's eastern bank, and used air power to attack artillery sites and military infrastructure. Israel also struck deeper into Egypt, seeking to disrupt command, transport and economic activity. The bombing campaign's military effects were significant but did not force Nasser to accept Israel's terms.
Both governments attempted diplomatic initiatives alongside combat. United Nations envoy Gunnar Jarring worked to implement Security Council Resolution 242, which linked withdrawal and recognition in a broader settlement. The effort did not produce agreement. The Arab League's Khartoum position opposed peace, recognition and negotiations with Israel, though individual governments differed over strategy. Egypt continued to regard military action as necessary to alter the status quo, while Israel insisted that a ceasefire without a political settlement could not guarantee security.
Timeline
1967
Egyptian commandos moved into positions near Ras el-Ish on the eastern bank of the canal on 1 July. Israeli armor attacked them, driving the force back but suffering casualties. Egypt and Israel then exchanged artillery and air attacks. Egyptian MiGs and Israeli fighters clashed, and both sides probed the other's defenses. The naval fighting continued in July, including an engagement near the Rumani coast.
The sinking of INS Eilat in October marked a shift in the conflict. Egyptian missile boats used Soviet-made anti-ship missiles to strike the destroyer, killing 47 crew members. The attack demonstrated the effectiveness of missile boats against larger surface vessels and became a landmark in naval warfare. Israel responded by shelling oil facilities and depots near Suez. Egypt evacuated civilians from parts of the canal zone as the risk of renewed combat increased.
1968
During 1968, fighting consisted of artillery exchanges, commando operations and Israeli air attacks. Both sides sought to impose costs without triggering a full-scale war. Israel conducted raids against Egyptian military positions, while Egyptian forces targeted Israeli fortifications and patrols. The conflict's low-intensity character did not mean low risk for personnel: soldiers along the canal faced regular shelling, mines and sudden raids.
Israel's government and military debated how much force would compel Egypt to stop. Air attacks were intended to weaken military infrastructure and pressure Nasser, but they also risked expanding the conflict and increasing civilian harm. Egyptian units used the canal and nearby defenses to protect their positions. Soviet arms and technical support helped Egypt improve its capabilities, while Israel adapted its defensive system and relied on its more capable air force.
1969
On 8 March 1969, Egypt formally announced the start of a more intensive phase, often treated as the official launch of the War of Attrition. Egyptian artillery opened sustained fire on Israeli positions along the canal. The bombardments caused casualties and damaged fortifications. Israeli forces responded with air strikes, counter-battery fire and commando raids. On 9 March, Egyptian chief of staff Abdul Munim Riad was killed by an Israeli mortar attack while visiting the front, a major loss to Egypt's senior military leadership.
Heavy fighting continued from May through July. In July, Egyptian commandos raided Israeli installations, and Israeli naval commandos and Sayeret Matkal attacked the fortified Egyptian position at Green Island. The raid inflicted severe losses on both sides and destroyed the facility. Israel then launched Operation Boxer, a campaign of air strikes against anti-aircraft positions, artillery and tanks along the northern canal sector. Israel's air force carried out a much larger number of sorties, while Egyptian aircraft and air defenses attempted to contest control of the air.
In September, Israeli forces conducted Operation Raviv against Egypt's Red Sea coast. The operation followed a commando action against Egyptian naval facilities and used captured Egyptian equipment to confuse defenders. It demonstrated Israel's ability to carry out a raid far from the main front, but it also expanded the geographic scope of the conflict. Later in the year, Egyptian air defenses and aircraft achieved some successes, including the loss of Israeli Mirage and Phantom aircraft. In October, the United States and Soviet Union began diplomatic talks intended to end the fighting.
1970
Israel launched Operation Priha in January 1970, a series of air raids against military targets deeper inside Egypt. The attacks were intended to disrupt Egypt's war effort and force Nasser to seek a ceasefire. Egypt requested Soviet assistance, and Nasser traveled to Moscow to obtain additional air-defense systems. Soviet personnel began operating and supporting air-defense units, including missile batteries. The conflict thereby moved closer to direct confrontation between Israeli and Soviet forces.
Air strikes increasingly targeted locations near Cairo and other areas well beyond the immediate canal front. On 8 April, an Israeli raid hit the Bahr el-Baqar primary school, killing Egyptian children and adults. Israel said it had intended to strike a military installation. The incident provoked international criticism and demonstrated the civilian danger of deep-penetration bombing. Israel's attacks continued, while Egypt improved its air-defense network with Soviet support and moved missile systems closer to the canal.
In the summer, Soviet-operated and Egyptian air-defense systems challenged Israeli aircraft more effectively. Israeli and Soviet pilots clashed directly in July in Operation Rimon 20, a dogfight in which Israeli aircraft shot down Soviet-piloted MiGs. The presence of Soviet personnel raised the risk that the conflict could become a direct superpower confrontation. Egypt's strengthened defenses also enabled artillery to move closer to the canal and threaten Israeli positions. Israel faced growing aircraft losses and the prospect of a wider war.
The United States advanced the Rogers Plan, which proposed a ceasefire and restrictions on military activity near the front. Egypt, Israel and Jordan accepted an in-place ceasefire beginning on 7 August 1970. The agreement prohibited either side from changing the military status quo in a zone extending 50 kilometres on each side of the ceasefire line. Egypt moved missile batteries closer to the canal soon after the truce began, and Israel accused Egypt of violating the agreement. The ceasefire nevertheless largely held and ended the main phase of fighting.
Aftermath
The ceasefire did not resolve the conflict over Sinai or establish a peace agreement. Israel continued to hold the peninsula, and Egypt retained its claim to the territory. Nasser died in September 1970 and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. Sadat focused on rebuilding Egypt's military capacity and planning an operation to cross the canal. Three years later, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Israel later withdrew from Sinai under the Egypt–Israel peace treaty.
The ceasefire was designed to stop new military positions from being built close to the canal, where missile batteries could alter the balance quickly. Egypt and Israel interpreted the buffer restrictions differently, and Egypt moved air-defense systems forward soon after the agreement took effect. Israel viewed the movement as a breach; Egypt argued that the systems were defensive and necessary to protect its territory. This dispute did not restart the full campaign, but it showed that the truce rested on a fragile military arrangement rather than mutual trust. The ceasefire also left the canal closed to normal shipping, while Israeli forces remained deployed on the east bank and Egypt maintained forces to the west. Both governments used the pause to reassess strategy and prepare for a later confrontation.
Historians have assessed the outcome differently. Some argue that Israel successfully held the Bar-Lev Line and used air power to force Egypt toward negotiations. Others see the ceasefire as a strategic setback for Israel because Soviet-backed air defenses constrained Israeli operations and Egypt moved missiles closer to the canal. Some interpretations describe the result as a stalemate: neither side changed the front line, but Egypt rebuilt its forces and Israel incurred considerable casualties. These debates reflect different measures of success, including territory, morale, diplomacy and future military position.
Israel sustained hundreds of military deaths and about 227 civilian deaths, with estimates for soldiers killed ranging from 694 to 1,424. Egyptian deaths vary widely in published sources, from roughly 2,900 to 10,000 soldiers and civilians. The conflict also caused casualties among Jordanian, Syrian, Soviet and Cuban personnel and among armed groups. Aircraft losses were substantial, especially during the later air war. Complete totals remain uncertain because governments did not publish consistent records and sources use different definitions.
The war taught both sides about artillery, air defense, commando operations and the limits of strategic bombing. Egypt's air force and air-defense system changed considerably with Soviet equipment and personnel. Israel developed responses to surface-to-air missiles and built its own military doctrines around rapid maneuver and air superiority. The later 1973 war showed that the ceasefire had suspended combat without settling the causes that produced it.
Casualties
Israeli casualty estimates differ among military histories. One widely cited account gives 694 soldiers killed and 227 civilians, while other estimates place military deaths above 1,400. Thousands more were wounded, particularly along the Egyptian front. Israeli aircraft losses ranged from roughly two dozen to 30 in some accounts. The figures reflect the three fronts and the long duration of the conflict, rather than a single campaign with a clearly bounded casualty count.
Egyptian figures are even less certain. Estimates range from approximately 2,900 to 10,000 military personnel and civilians killed, with more than 6,000 wounded in some sources. Egyptian aircraft losses varied by source and by whether air-to-air combat, missiles and accidents were included. Soviet forces suffered deaths and aircraft losses, though published lists are incomplete. Jordanian, Syrian, Kuwaiti and Cuban personnel also suffered fatalities. Armed groups lost fighters and had members captured. These numbers should be read as estimates, not a complete census.
Civilians lived with repeated shelling, evacuation and disruption along the canal. Egyptian authorities moved residents from exposed areas, while Israeli communities near the front faced attacks and military restrictions. Both sides' use of artillery and aircraft affected infrastructure beyond military posts. The human cost contributed to domestic pressure, but neither side accepted the other's political conditions during the war.
Quellen
- 1Israel: The War of Attritionbritannica.com
- 2The Khartoum Conference and Egyptian Policy after the 1967 War: A Reexaminationjstor.org
- 3The Myth of Strategic Bombing: Israeli Deep-Penetration Air Raids in the War of Attrition, 1969–70doi.org
- 4Israel-Egypt Ceasefire Agreement – Text – English (1970)ecf.org.il
- 5Warship Eilat Is Sunkisraeled.org
Themen außerhalb des Nahen Ostens verlinken auf die Encyclopaedia Britannica.